• Home
  • Blog
  • Digital Scorched Earth: Targeting the U.S. Economy via Information Warfare

Digital Scorched Earth: Targeting the U.S. Economy via Information Warfare

0 comments

[ad_1]

03:38

Raffles—Singapore Hotel

He woke up with a start. “What . . . the . . . f . . . is going on in my head?” he asked himself. It felt like his skull had been pulped by a sadist swinging a sledgehammer, and he felt internal pressure akin to opening a car window at 90 mph. Why wouldn’t his right eye stop blinking, he wondered? He tried to peer at the red diodes of the clock on the nightstand. “3 . . . 3 . . . 3 . . . 3:38,” he finally made out. Trying to get out of the hotel bed, he slipped and fell.

“Blood. Blood-taste. Grass, grass in my mouth.” Crumpled on the field. Looking through his helmet. “Choate.” Why was he thinking about prep-school lacrosse? CONCUSSION. Crap, crap, he had a concussion in lacrosse. What was his mind telling him? On all fours now, it came into focus: AHI! An Anomalous Health Incident, in the anodyne bureaucratic language that described what was either a weapon or some sort of surveillance tool. If he could just reach the hallway, his protective detail would get him the hell out of here.

CNN International

“Breaking news out of Singapore. The American delegation led by the U.S. Trade Representative has abruptly left the country. In recent days, the United States has neared final agreement with both Singapore and Brunei on bilateral commerce agreements. The administration has been pursuing trade deals with many of the Asian nations with whom the U.S. had previously coordinated the much larger Trans-Pacific Partnership, which the Trump administration withdrew from.”

“There are unconfirmed reports that the Trade Representative and others traveling with him may have suffered episodes of the so-called ‘Havana Syndrome.’ CNN will continue to follow this story closely and provide updates as they become available.”

MSC CALDERONE

300 nautical miles west of Port Long Beach, California

Harish Shankar was the chief mate of the MSC Calderone, a fifteen-year-old 177-meter-long container ship hauling Vietnamese-made athletic shoes to U.S. consumers. Harish’s parents had been tea sellers just like the family of his idol, Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Like Modi, he had joined the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) paramilitary organization and taken to the mix of Hindu religiosity and discipline modeled on European fascist youth groups of the 1930s. “Success is a matter of applying yourself,” he thought.

Growing up in the ethnic borderland of West Bengal, he agreed with Amit Shah—the president of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) who had described the Muslim population as termites burrowing into the Hindu state. As a result, Shankar was dismissive of his largely Muslim Filipino crew and kept mostly to himself.

Perhaps if he had engaged more with the mechanics in the engine room, someone might have shown him the video that was racking up millions of views as it was shared among sailors. The clip allegedly showed Modi speaking to leaders of the 2M shipping alliance who agreed to desert Muslim crews on derelict ships as a cost-saving measure. Harish knew the fear that had been racing around merchant fleets as incidents of sailors being abandoned by their owners had climbed exponentially. The video would later be debunked as a deep-fake, but this was of little relevance to the first officer as the fire-axe burst through his cabin-door and the lynch-mob poured through the hatch to drag him from his bunk.

05:05 Pacific Time

Long Beach, California

Rafael “Rafa” Alvarez had started as a stevedore on the docks and worked his way up to become a senior International Longshoremen’s Association local rep. He lowered the tailgate of his new F-150 and handed out signs to the men snaked out behind it ready to picket. All of them were incensed by the dump of 250 emails posted to a website that suggested a plan by Long Beach Container Terminal, LLC to increase automation and force out workers to make the port attractive for sale to a foreign owner.

Trini DeSoto came up to Rafa to relay the news that one of the junior members had already retaliated with his own “dump” in the middle of the warehouse, holding produce shipments to wholesalers throughout the region waiting. Someone would be reporting the incident shortly to the authorities, which would shut down the site until a “biological incident response team” could ensure that consumers were not exposed to a health risk. If the port owners wanted to play hardball, the union could show them who was really the boss, particularly once Americans on the West Coast started missing out on their avocado-toast and Chipotle salad-bowls.

NPR

Morning Edition

“First, the news: New details are coming out on the strange case of Ben Otis, the Deputy National Security Advisor who was a close campaign aide to the president. Otis was arrested Saturday night by a Fairfax County SWAT team at his home in McLean, Virginia outside Washington, D.C. based on reports of an imminent threat to his wife as well as allegations of child trafficking. County prosecutors have dropped the charges of kidnapping, but Otis remains in jail due to incriminating material allegedly found on his laptop. His lawyer, Cindy Nelson, has issued a statement claiming that Otis was a victim of ‘swatting.’ In addition, her press release states that forensic analysis will prove that his computer had been hacked and the files deposited by a hostile actor. Otis continues to be held pending a bond-hearing.

“Turning to the West Coast, protests at the port in Oakland turned violent overnight with striking union workers setting several commercial trucks on fire and barricading the port’s main entrance. The governor has deployed the national guard to the city as a precaution after looting broke out in a neighborhood near the port. Early reports are of multiple arrests and the possible shooting of a police officer.

“In a moment, we will speak with an expert on right-wing extremism to talk about the latest conspiracy theory that has caused several Western militia groups to claim that they will mobilize their forces to stop any ‘takeover’ of California by the U.S. military. What’s behind the so-called ‘Jade Helm X’ scenario trending on far-right social media?”

Bloomberg.com

Shares of leading U.S. shipping companies including UPS and FedEx tumbled dramatically in early morning trading following the grounding of most cargo flights. IT experts describe a cyber-attack seemingly targeting delivery businesses similar to the NotPetya attack in 2017 that nearly sunk Danish super-shipper A.P. Møller-Maersk.

Washington, DC

Ronald Reagan Building & International Trade Center

Dressed like many other millennials heading to the office in a blazer, khakis, and work-boots with a messenger-bag slung over his shoulder, he strode upwards past other commuters still checking their iPhones or making last minute updates to their makeup on the Metro escalator. He often bragged about serving as a special operator in Afghanistan, not mentioning the fact that his time as an admin clerk for JSOC in Bagram was cut short by the Article 15 he received for misconduct, and his separation from the Army not long after. As he clicked on the GoPro and started to livestream, he declared, “It’s time to strike a blow against globalists and take back our country!” He unzipped his satchel and removed a machine-pistol as he strode towards the main-doors, unaware that the entrance featured enhanced security measures because the headquarters of U.S. Customs and Border Protection was a tenant of the complex.

The Threat

On 15 June 2021, the Chief of U.S. Naval Operations, Admiral Michael M. Gilday, testified to the House Armed Services Committee and reaffirmed that “America is a maritime nation” dependent on the freedom of the seas. The Admiral highlighted that 90 percent of global trade by volume is transported by shipping, which facilitates $3.7 trillion dollars in U.S. commerce. More specifically, 70 percent of U.S. international trade is moved at sea, with 72 percent of all U.S. exports by tonnage conveyed via water.

Supply-chains continue to be snarled by COVID, so further directed attacks against ocean-borne commerce and U.S. supply-chains could grievously damage the U.S. economy. Coordinated attacks against the public and political leadership through application of a full spectrum of information warfare methods might allow an adversary to disrupt decision-making without relying on kinetic strikes and reducing the risk of direct attribution.

The scenarios laid out at the outset of this essay could easily be carried out by the Russians or Chinese, or the two in concert delivering coordinated blows over a series of days. But the proliferation of technology makes it possible for others to employ most of these methods, including other rogue regimes—and possibly even transnational non-state actors (such as multi-billion-dollar drug trafficking organizations). Senior foreign government officials including—ten prime ministers, three presidents, and a king—were hit by zero-click attacks from the Pegasus Group, which sought to take over their smart-phones. The democratization of high-tech tools levels the playing field (allowing even minor countries such as Rwanda to obtain the same capabilities that Saudi Arabian and Emirati Petro-dollars have purchased), with Kigali deploying the Pegasus exploit against dissidents.

While the intelligence community has concluded that many suspected “Havana Syndrome” cases can be attributed to other causes—and do not believe that a foreign government is conducting a wholesale attack against U.S. diplomats, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence cannot explain a subset of the reported cases. The U.S. government remains perplexed by the mechanism behind the injuries suffered by this group of American diplomats, intelligence officers, and military personnel and unable to attribute it to an actor or determine its true purpose. The delay of Vice President Kamala Harris’s travel to Vietnam last year following a suspected incident demonstrates that these events can impact the conduct of U.S. foreign policy at a strategic level. In a February 2022 “60 Minutes” episode, several former top officials in the Trump administration stated that they and others they knew had suffered episodes they believe were related to “Havana Syndrome” attacks. Interviewed in the broadcast, former National Security Advisor John Bolton stated his concern that the use of such a mechanism against senior White House officials “could render us extremely vulnerable.”

The spread of viral rumors on WhatsApp leading to communal violence in India has become an all-too-common occurrence, frequently leading to lynchings, looting, and refugee flows. The combination of a hundreds of millions of unsophisticated consumers relying on messaging applications for news, and growth in “deep fake” technology, makes the scenario of intentional manipulation of mob violence credible. Conditions for seamen are tenuous as they are often poorly or simply unpaid, with limited rights, and increasingly abandoned by owners looking to save costs. At the same time, these self-described “scum of the earth” are increasingly networked, confident with technology (88 percent in a recent survey claim to be savvy) and have access to the internet (75 percent have connectivity at sea). This is a cohort primed to be manipulated by weaponized disinformation.

The other scenarios described have occurred or could easily occur based on recent examples. “Doxing” and “swatting” have led to deaths, and are often politically motivated; a hostile actor could use them as well. In late January and early February 2022, cyber-attacks against several major European ports terminals caused significant disruptions, with one Dutch operator to have to cease operations globally, and the impact of the attack against two German logistics companies led Shell Oil to reroute supplies to other depots. Zero-click tools such as the NSO-group’s Pegasus exploit can completely takeover a victim’s phone without their knowledge, and thus purloined messages could be leaked by an adversary. Members of the Russian military’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)’s Advanced Persistent Threat actor “Fancy Bear” were indicted for “spear-phishing” Clinton presidential campaign chair John Podesta, which allowed them to steal emails off of his computer. It would be equally possible to have used that access to add incriminating files to his laptop. Child-trafficking allegations easily fit into the Q-Anon and adjacent echo-chamber and there are sizeable examples of hostile actors seeking to exploit social media to generate political outcomes. The deep distrust and conspiracy theorizing of many—particularly the far right—prime them to believe disinformation, which has sometimes led to violence.

Developing Solutions

The U.S. military is increasingly alert to the threat posed by information warfare. While critics note that responses often remain siloed by service, there is increasingly greater coordination across the Department of Defense. Initial efforts are underway to “declassify and share data” with foreign allies. But the threat is not solely a military one, and requires greater collaboration across the federal government.

To effectively defend the information domain, the United States should reconsider the scattershot structure it has fallen into. Currently, the Department of State is responsible for countering disinformation through the little-known Global Engagement Center (GEC)–established in March 2016, initially only to counter the Islamic State’s media efforts. The State Department itself is understaffed, particularly in senior positions, and suffers from poor morale. Furthermore, the State Department’s poor performance during the evacuation of Afghanistan should give little confidence that it is up to the task. The State Department was not interested in assuming the mission given to the GEC, and the GEC remains poorly resourced.

A first effort could be to remove the mission from the GEC and re-establish the United States Information Agency (USIA), which led U.S. efforts to win the war of ideas during the Cold War. A new USIA should be moved outside of state’s aegis to the intelligence community (IC), which would allow close coordination with the Defense Department as well as state’s public diplomacy program. As a member of the IC, this USIA could coordinate with its natural partners; the Director of National Security’s Open Source Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, etc. A new USIA will need to be properly resourced with substantial personnel increases from the GEC, and a budget that would allow for timely responses to global threats.

The United States should also develop a new workforce to serve as the primary operators to counter disinformation. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has created an effective social media strike-force to counter Hamas and control the narrative in the digital realm. The IDF primarily relies upon its young draftees who are digital natives well-accustomed to developing memes, serving as lifestyle influencers, and adept at various platforms. Reformers argue that the intelligence community needs to be reorganized to accommodate the workforce of today and pivot from its 1950s model, which was built in the age of the “organization man” or “man in the gray flannel suit” who dedicated his career to one company. Millennials and Generation Z expect to routinely “move jobs multiple times in a career.” Collaborating with universities and/or private industry, a new USIA could set up a program to recruit talent willing to serve two-to-four years at some point from high school, during college, or as immediate graduates through federal scholarships or loan-forgiveness programs. “Graduates” of USIA service would be certified as skilled practitioners in any area of media/public relations/security/reputational defense of growing interest to private sector employers.

Information warfare threats will only increase in the coming years. The United States should consider reorganizing its efforts—primarily through a free-standing USIA—and recruit and retain a new workforce with the skills and aptitude to counter adversaries’ attempts to damage United States interests through active disinformation, misuse of social media, and other forms of gray-zone subversion.

[ad_2]

Source link

About the Author

Follow me


{"email":"Email address invalid","url":"Website address invalid","required":"Required field missing"}
Tactical Stars and Stripes
Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies so that we can provide you with the best user experience possible. Cookie information is stored in your browser and performs functions such as recognising you when you return to our website and helping our team to understand which sections of the website you find most interesting and useful.